Perceptual justification: factive reasons and fallible virtues by Kelp, Christoph & Ghijsen, Harmen
  
 
 
 
 
Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Perceptual justification: factive reasons and fallible 
virtues. In: Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in 
Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 
164-183. ISBN 9781138925168. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/140970/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 15 May 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Perceptual Justification:
Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues
Christoph Kelp and Harmen Ghijsen∗
Abstract
Two different versions of epistemological disjunctivism have re-
cently been upheld in the literature: a traditional, Justified True
Belief Epistemological Disjunctivism (JTBED) and a Knowledge
First Epistemological Disjunctivism (KFED). JTBED holds that
factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” provide the ratio-
nal support in virtue of which one has perceptual knowledge,
while KFED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that
p” just are ways of knowing that p which additionally provide
justification for believing that p. We argue that both accounts
remain ultimately unsatisfactory. JTBED faces two formidable
problems: first, it cannot account for animal knowledge, and,
second, it does not offer a satisfactory account of how we access
factive reasons. Although KFED can solve these two problems,
it has some problems of its own. While intuitively knowledge is
logically stronger than justified belief, on KFED it turns out to
be weaker: knowledge does not entail justified belief, but jus-
tified belief does entail knowledge. Nevertheless, disjunctivists
are right on at least a couple of points: we standardly justify
our perceptual beliefs by appealing to factive reasons such as
seeing that p and so factive reasons ought to play some role
in our theory of justification. In addition, KFED’s account of
our access to factive reasons also is spot on. Rather than going
disjunctivist, these insights can be suitably incorporated into a
Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology (KFVE).
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Introduction
Two different versions of epistemological disjunctivism have recently
been upheld in the literature, both inspired by John McDowell’s writ-
ings [e.g., 1982, 1994, 2008]. Duncan Pritchard [2012a] defends a ver-
sion of epistemological disjunctivism according to which the fact that
S sees that p provides the rational support in virtue of which S knows
that p. Pritchard can thus be taken to promote a version of a Justi-
fied True Belief (JTB) account of perceptual knowledge. In contrast,
Alan Millar [2010] defends a Knowledge First (KF) version of epis-
temological disjunctivism, according to which seeing that p is a way
of knowing that p. While, in Millar’s view, seeing that p does not
constitute the kind of rational support in virtue of which one knows
that p, it does constitute a factive reason that serves to justify one’s
belief that p.
In this paper we argue that both versions of epistemological dis-
junctivism are ultimately unsuccessful. In §1, we discuss Pritchard’s
JTB version of the view (JTBED) and its purported motivations. In §2,
we raise two problems for JTBED: first, it cannot account for animal
knowledge, and, second, it does not offer a satisfactory account of
how we can access factive reasons. In §3, we present Millar’s knowl-
edge first epistemological disjunctivism (KFED), and show that it can
avoid these two problems. In §4 we argue that KFED has some prob-
lems of its own: while intuitively knowledge is logically stronger
than justified belief, by Millar’s lights, it turns out to be weaker:
knowledge does not entail justified belief, but justified belief does
entail knowledge. Finally, in §5, we argue that even though both
versions of epistemological disjunctivism remain ultimately unsuc-
cessful, disjunctivists have a number of important insights. We also
show how these insights can be incorporated in a plausible account
of how we can justify our perceptual beliefs.
1 Pritchard’s JTBED
The core thesis of Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism is as fol-
lows:
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent,
S, has perceptual knowledge that φ in virtue of being in
possession of rational support, R, for her belief that φ
which is both factive (i.e., R’s obtaining entails φ) and re-
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flectively accessible to S.
[Pritchard 2012a: 13]
According to Pritchard, an agent S has paradigmatic1 perceptual
knowledge in virtue of having a specific type of justification which
ensures that the perceptual beliefs it supports are true. Perceptual
knowledge is thus analysed as justified, true belief, although the type
of justification is different from the type of justification that tradi-
tional JTB accounts have appealed to. Traditional accounts appealed
to fallible reasons to provide the justification required for knowledge,
reasons that are in principle compatible with the falsity of the belief
in question — although knowledge of course requires that the be-
lief in question is in fact true. In contrast, according to JTBED the
relevant type of justification has to do with having reflectively acces-
sible factive reasons, that is, reasons which entail that the beliefs they
support are true.
The combination of factivity and accessibility is what makes JTB-
ED counterintuitive. According to JTBED, a subject has reflective ac-
cess to a factive reason in an epistemically good case, while it merely
seems to the subject as if he had reflective access to such a reason in
an introspectively indistinguishable epistemically bad case (e.g. in an
hallucination). Pritchard goes to great lengths to argue that factivity
and accessibility can be combined, but has surprisingly little to say
about what exactly reflective accessibility amounts to other than that
“the subject can come to know through reflection alone that she is
in possession of this rational support" (ibid.). We will return to this
point later on.
Let’s get a little more concrete about the kind of reasons in play
in perceptual knowledge. According to Pritchard:
The particular kind of rational support that the epistemo-
logical disjunctivist claims that our beliefs enjoy in para-
digm cases of perceptual knowledge is that provided by
seeing that the target proposition obtains. So when one
has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge of a proposition,
p, one’s reflectively accessible rational support for believ-
ing that p is that one sees that p. Seeing that p is factive,
however, in that if it is the case that one sees that p then p
1 In what follows, we will take Pritchard’s restriction to paradigmatic cases of
perceptual knowledge as read.
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must be true.
[Pritchard 2012a: 14]
According to Pritchard, seeing that p is, at least for the case of
visual perception, what supports perceptual knowledge of p. For in-
stance, when a subject S is looking at a tree in epistemically favourable
conditions such that there are no non-tree look-a-likes in the environ-
ment, S’s perceptual faculties are working correctly, no deceivers are
present, etc., then S’s rational support for the belief that there is a tree
is the fact that S sees that there is a tree. This fact is reflectively acces-
sible to S and entails that there is a tree. In contrast, when a subject
S′ hallucinates a tree, then S′ does not see that there is a tree, so the
same kind of rational support is not present to be accessed by S′. Of
course, S′ might think that he has the same kind of rational support
while hallucinating a tree, but thinking that one has a certain reason
comes apart from actually having this reason on the epistemological
disjunctivist’s picture.
What motivations are there to uphold such a view of perceptual
knowledge? A first motivation is that it can easily accommodate our
ordinary way of talking and thinking about perceptual knowledge.
If someone challenges your claim to know that, e.g., your mutual
friend is also at the party on the grounds that he usually does not
go to parties, then you might well support your knowledge claim by
saying that you know your friend is here because you see that he is
standing over there. In this scenario, you justify your claim to know
that your friend is at the party precisely by appealing to the factive
reason that supported your knowledge in the first place. At least,
that is a natural way to interpret what is going on in the imagined
case.2
A second motivation for JTBED, and, according to Pritchard, the
most important one, is that it can capture key elements of both in-
ternalism and externalism in epistemology. It is for that reason that
Pritchard portrays the view as being “the holy grail of epistemology"
[2012a: 1]. Perceptual knowledge has to do with having reasons that
are reflectively accessible, just as the internalist wants, but those rea-
sons are also factive, thus securing the connection between epistemic
support and truth that has been stressed by externalists. The first
element allows for taking epistemic responsibility for one’s beliefs,
2 Note, however, that even Pritchard acknowledges that it might not be the only
way [2012a: 17-8]. Note also that we offer an alternative in §5.
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while the second makes sure that one cannot be justified in a body of
beliefs that still entirely falls short of the truth.3
If JTBED can indeed incorporate key internalist and externalist
elements, then it would surely be a strong contender as a theory of
perceptual knowledge. However, we think that Pritchard’s epistemo-
logical disjunctivism encounters a number of serious problems. This
will be the topic for our next section.
2 Problems for JTBED
2.1 Animal knowledge
One of Pritchard’s core motivations for JTBED is that it reconciles in-
ternalism and externalism, by incorporating insights from both sides.
In this way, JTBED is said to bring the holy grail of epistemology
within reach. Unfortunately, on reflection, it is not clear that JTBED
manages to accommodate all insights of internalists and external-
ists. In particular, we believe that JTBED struggles to accommodate
a key externalist idea, to wit, that cognitively unsophisticated believ-
ers, like animals and small children, are capable of having knowl-
edge, even when they are not cognitively sophisticated enough to be
able to access to reasons for their beliefs. This problem of “hyper-
intellectualization” (Burge 2003: 503, see also Dretske e.g. 1981) is
especially relevant to “accessibilist” accounts of perceptual knowl-
edge on which one perceptually knows that p only if one has a re-
flectively accessible reason for p [e.g. Chisholm 1977, BonJour 1985,
3 In addition, Pritchard provides a third motivation, to wit, that JTBED offers
a particularly attractive solution to the problem of scepticism. This solution is
neo-Moorean in that it grants that we can know that radical sceptical hypotheses
are false. Pritchard takes JTBED’s version of neo-Mooreanism to be preferable
to externalist versions of the view because the latter “side-step” [Pritchard 2012a:
120] the problem, whereas the former can take it “head-on” [Pritchard 2012a: 134].
While we believe that a neo-Moorean approach to scepticism carries promise, we
do not agree with Pritchard that JTBED-style neo-Mooreanism is preferable to its
externalist competitors, for at least the following two reasons. First, it is not at all
clear to us that this charge is legitimate to begin with. Second, we think that there
is independent reason to think that externalism is preferable to JTBED, some of
which we will develop in §2 below. In fact, we believe the independent case for
externalism to so strong as to render the charge of side-stepping the problem of
scepticism small by comparison, even if it turned out to be legitimate. As a result,
we are also inclined to favour an externalist version of neo-Mooreanism. That said,
we will not take the time to argue this point in any detail here. Instead we will
set aside the issue of scepticism and focus on the two other motivations for JTBED
Pritchard offers.
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Steup 1999]. The externalist solution is to give an account of knowl-
edge that does not require justification [e.g. Goldman 1967, Dretske
1981, Kornblith 2008], or to allow for at least a kind of justification
which does not require any access to reasons [e.g. Goldman 1979,
Lyons 2009, Kelp 2015a].
Since JTBED requires as an accessible reason for the perceptual
belief that p the fact that S sees that p, it runs head-first into the
hyper-intellectualization problem. What is required to access the fac-
tive reason that S sees that p is at the very least a belief on the part
of the subject that he sees that p. Yet this is precisely what unso-
phisticated believers cannot achieve, and so, for these believers, the
relevant factive reasons for perceptual knowledge and justification
turn out not to be accessible. In consequence, unsophisticated believ-
ers are unable to have perceptual knowledge and justification, and
so Pritchard cannot accommodate the externalist insight we started
with.
It is not hard to see that Pritchard faces the hyper-intellectualisa-
tion worry because he embraces an accessibilist version of internal-
ism. Given that this is so, one might think that the problem can
be easily avoided. After all, there are other versions of internalism
on the market. Most notably, there is mentalism according to which
the justificatory status of one’s beliefs supervenes on one’s mental
states [Feldman and Conee 2001]. Even unsophisticated agents can
host a variety of mental states, including mental states of the kind
that, according to mentalism, serve to provide justification for per-
ceptual beliefs in adult human beings. As a result, it would seem
that, unlike accessibilism, mentalism can steer clear of the hyper-
intellectualisation worry. So couldn’t Pritchard avoid the problem by
abandoning accessibilism in favour of a mentalist version of internal-
ism?
JTBED is certainly compatible with mentalism. In fact, Pritchard
himself considers this kind of view. The core idea here is that the
relevant factive reasons are taken to be factive mental states in their
own right. For instance, on this view, seeing that p is a mental state in
its own right. Moreover, it is quite plausible that a mentalist version
of JTBED would solve the hyper-intellectualisation problem. After
all, it is plausible that even unsophisticated agents can and often do
see that p. If so, it is also plausible that they can have perceptual
knowledge that p in virtue of seeing that p.
As Pritchard himself realises, however, he is committed to a specif-
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ically accessibilist version of internalism [Pritchard 2012a: 41]. Why?
Because of the way he motivates the internalist component of his
view. Here is Pritchard:
[E]pistemic externalism entails that there is a significant
degree of reflective opacity in the epistemic standing of
our beliefs. This generates a fundamental difficulty for
epistemic externalist positions, which is that it is hard on
this view to capture any adequate notion of epistemic re-
sponsibility. For if the facts in virtue of which one’s beliefs
enjoy a good epistemic standing are not reflectively avail-
able to one, then in what sense is one even able to take
epistemic responsibility for that epistemic standing?
[Pritchard 2012a: 2]
According to Pritchard, the reason why externalism fails is that it
cannot offer an adequate account of epistemic responsibility. This, in
turn, is because it would seem that no account of epistemic responsi-
bility can be satisfactory unless it features an accessibility condition.
It is not hard to see that if this argument works against externalism,
it will be equally effective against mentalism. Or, to be more precise,
it is equally effective against any version of mentalism that would
solve the hyper-intellectualisation worry. After all, any such account
will have to abandon the abovementioned accessibility requirement.
As a result, while adopting mentalism in addition to accessibilism is
an option for Pritchard, replacing the latter by the former isn’t.
Here is another response to the hyper-intellectualisation worry
one might give on behalf of Pritchard. Recall that Pritchard explic-
itly restricts his account of perceptual knowledge to paradigm cases
of perceptual knowledge. If so, couldn’t Pritchard simply deny that
cases featuring unsophisticated agents are paradigm cases of percep-
tual knowledge? In that case, it is compatible with everything he says
that unsophisticated agents can have perceptual knowledge after all.
This move simply won’t do the trick here. To see this notice that
Pritchard characterises paradigmatic perceptual knowledge as “per-
ceptual knowledge which is gained in good+ cases” [Pritchard 2012a:
37]. A “good+ case” is defined as a case with the following five char-
acteristics: (i) The agent’s environment is epistemically hospitable
and the relevant faculties producing the belief that p are functioning
properly (the case is “objectively epistemically good”). (ii) The agent
has no defeaters for p (the case is “subjectively epistemically good”).
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(iii) The agent has a veridical experience and a true belief that p.
(iv) The agent sees that p. (v) The agent knows that p [Pritchard
2012a: 29]. Now the problem for Pritchard is that cases in which
unsophisticated agents acquire perceptual knowledge often exhibit
all five characteristics. If so, by Pritchard’s lights, these cases qualify
as paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Since agents still don’t
satisfy the accessibility condition, the envisaged response on behalf
of Pritchard remains unsuccessful.4
2.2 An account of access
Once one starts considering what it takes to access a factive reason,
other problems show up for JTBED. Pritchard does not really explain
what it means to have reflective access to a factive reason, other than
that it “usually means that the subject can come to know through
reflection alone that she is in possession of this rational support."
[Pritchard 2012a: 13] But if reflective access is cashed out in terms of
knowledge, then it seems reasonable to ask what the rational support
of this knowledge in turn is. And now JTBED is either a) locked in a
regress, each level requiring reflective access to, i.e. possible knowl-
edge of, another reason, b) forced to acknowledge some kind of im-
mediate ground for the knowledge that S sees that p, or c) forced to
reject any ground for this knowledge.
We take it that option (a) is simply not palatable (pace infinitists
such as Klein e.g. 1998). Accepting option (b) is also problematic. For
instance, suppose that one accepts option (b) and claims that experi-
ence provides the immediate ground for the knowledge that S sees
that p, in the sense that a subject having an experience that p would
4 But couldn’t Pritchard maintain that seeing that p features an accessibility
condition in the sense that one sees that p only if one is in a position to know
by reflection alone that one sees that p? If so, cases of perceptual knowledge by
unsophisticated agents are not cases of seeing that p and so do not qualify as
paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Again this won’t do. First, there is little
hope that Pritchard’s motivations for an accessibility condition on knowledge and
justified belief will work for seeing that p as well. Even if knowing and believing
justifiably feature a responsibility condition and hence, according to Pritchard, an
accessibility condition, there is little reason to think that seeing that p also features
a responsibility condition. As a result, there is no reason to think that seeing that
p will feature an accessibility condition. Second, as we have already indicated, it
is independently plausible that unsophisticated agents may and often do see that
p, e.g. when they acquire visual perceptual knowledge that p. In addition, then,
there is positive reason to think that seeing that p does not feature an accessibility
condition.
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be immediately justified in believing that S sees that p. We would
then have a theory according to which experience that p provides the
rational support for the knowledge that S sees that p, which in turn
provides the rational support for p. Surely one should then cut out
the middle man, and just go for the theory which claims that experi-
ence rationally supports the belief that p directly. This strategy seems
applicable for any ground JTBED could come up with: why not use
that theory of immediate grounds directly for perceptual beliefs?
Option (c) suffers from the same problem. Suppose one claims
that one knows that one sees that p because of the reliability of the
introspective mechanism that gives this belief as output. Then one
could ask why the reliability of introspection is sufficient for knowl-
edge of the fact that one sees that p, but the reliability of perception
is not sufficient for knowledge of the fact that p. Again the problem
is that for any proposal the question will arise why this could not
be used directly to account for perceptual knowledge itself.5 JTBED
thus seems hard pressed to provide an account of reflective access
to factive reasons that does not make its own theory of perceptual
justification superfluous.
3 Millar’s KFED
We have seen that Pritchard’s JTBED remains ultimately unsuccess-
ful. In this section, we will turn to Millar’s knowledge first version of
epistemological disjunctivism (KFED). We will first outline the view
and then argue that it can avoid the problems that Pritchard’s JTBED
encountered.
3.1 Knowledge first
The crucial difference between Millar’s version of epistemological
disjunctivism and that of Pritchard is that Millar takes knowledge to be
the notion in terms of which justification should be explained. Millar
thus follows Timothy Williamson [2000] in providing a knowledge first
epistemology. One of the main reasons for taking this route is that it
best reflects the way in which the concept of knowledge is applied in
5 Note that once one does use proposal (b) or (c) to account for perceptual
knowledge directly, the hyper-intellectualization problem will also be solved. This
points to the fact that JTBED is not better off, and perhaps even worse off, than
some of the more traditional internalist and externalist theories of justification.
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our everyday practices. We do not seem to apply the complex con-
ditions that have been proposed in analyses of knowledge when we
judge that S knows p. What we do is different:
We happily count people as knowing that something is an F
when they see an F, and they may be presumed to have what it
takes to tell of something they see that it is an F from the way
it looks. [ . . . ] The conceptual level at which we encounter the
perceptual knowledge that we have, or that others have, is that
of knowing that p through seeing or otherwise perceiving that
p, by means of an ability to tell that such a thing is so from the
look or other appearance of what is perceived.
[Millar 2010: 133-4]
According to Millar, we should not try to give a reductive account
of knowledge, but rather attempt to elucidate it by means of an in-
vestigation of the specific abilities exercises of which allow us to gain
it, as it is precisely these abilities that we seem to latch on to when
we ordinarily ascribe knowledge to someone.
In the case of perception, the relevant abilities are perceptual-recog-
nitional abilities, which are ways of telling that things are so from their
appearances, where appearances are just the way things look, sound,
smell, etc. For subjects to have these abilities, it is important that
the presented appearances are distinctive of the recognised objects
in the sense that “[w]hen an appearance of something is distinctive
of Fs, not easily could something have this appearance and not be
an F" [Millar 2010: 125]. Perceptual-recognitional abilities are thus
environment-dependent. This accords with the intuition that Barney
cannot know that there is a barn in front of him when he is looking at
one of the few real barns in fake barn county. In such a scenario, there
are too many fake look-a-likes around that make the appearance of
the real barn no longer distinctive of a real barn. Millar even goes as
far as to claim that Barney, when in fake barn county, does not just
fail to exercise the requisite perceptual-recognitional ability, but even
lacks this ability altogether [Millar 2010: 126].
In contrast, a subject fails to exercise a perceptual-recognitional
ability that he does possess in the situation where the environment
is in fact favourable, but the subject nevertheless does not recognise
something for what it is. This might happen when a subject is care-
less in his judgement, or is just unlucky enough to encounter the only
fake look-a-like in the entire environment. In any case, the important
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point is that, as Millar construes it, the notion of exercise of an ability
is a success notion [Millar 2010: 125]: one cannot exercise an ability to
φ unless one φs. Applied to the case of perceptual-recognitional abil-
ities this means that one cannot exercise a perceptual-recognitional
ability without knowing that such-and-so is the case.
Another crucial point for Millar is that the distinctive appear-
ances that are required for having a perceptual-recognitional ability
do not serve as evidence on the basis of which one concludes that
something is an F. Millar provides three convincing reasons for this
claim [Millar 2010: 121–22]. First, thinking of experiences as evi-
dence gets the phenomenology of perceptual recognition wrong: we
are not aware of basing our judgement that, say, Bill is here on the
appearance that Bill presents. Second, people are often able to recog-
nise persons or things without being able to articulate on the basis of
which features precisely they recognised them. The case that springs
to mind is that of the chicken-sexers who are able to recognise the
sex of a chick even though they do not know how they do it and
sometimes even have false beliefs about how they do it (they believe
that they do it by sight, but they actually do it by smell).6 Of course
one might hold that this just shows that chicken-sexers do not know
the sex of a chick, but then the same will appear to be true for many
other instances of perceptual recognition. Third, thinking of appear-
ances as evidence for recognitional judgements actually gets the or-
der of understanding the wrong way. Creatures capable of perceptual
knowledge need not be capable of thinking in terms of appearances,
nor does it seem likely that we first think in terms of appearances and
then go on to think in terms of things belonging to a certain kind.
3.2 Perceptual justification
It should be clear that Millar thinks that perceptual knowledge is not
to be reduced to beliefs that are justified on the basis of some kind
of evidence. But this raises a question as to what makes his view
epistemological disjunctivist. Consider again what Pritchard takes to
be the main thesis of epistemological disjunctivism:
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent,
S, has perceptual knowledge that φ in virtue of being in
6 Note that it does not appear all too important whether this example is ac-
tual. Even if this description is not accurate of chicken-sexers, relevantly similar
examples do seem possible [cf. Pritchard 2006: 61].
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possession of rational support, R, for her belief that φ
which is both factive (i.e., R’s obtaining entails φ) and re-
flectively accessible to S.
[Pritchard 2012a: 13]
Since Millar does not agree with Pritchard that an agent has per-
ceptual knowledge in virtue of being in possession of factive rational
support, Millar’s theory would not count as epistemological disjunc-
tivist according to this definition. But Millar does agree that an agent
often has factive, reflectively accessible rational support in paradig-
matic cases of perceptual knowledge:
[E]pisodes in which I come to know that an animal I am
looking at is a zebra are, barring rare, dire confusion, or
rare and bizarre deception, episodes in which the fact that
I see that the animal is a zebra is available to me as a
reason to believe that it is a zebra and to continue to be-
lieve that it was thereafter. The intimate connection be-
tween perceptual knowledge and justified belief is accom-
modated by acknowledging that the fact that I see that the
animal is a zebra can constitute a reason I have to take it
to be one. But instead of explaining the knowledge as, so
to speak, built up from justified belief, we treat the knowl-
edge as what enables one to be justified in believing.
[Millar 2010: 139]
On Millar’s account, justification has to do with being in posses-
sion of clinching reasons for belief, i.e. reasons that settle it that the
belief is true. Possession of such reasons in turn implies that a sub-
ject “[stands] in some relation to a (distinct) consideration in view of
which [the subject] is justified" [Millar 2010: 112]. Thus, even though
Millar does not think that knowledge must be built up from eviden-
tially supported beliefs, he does take justification to consist in having
accessible, clinching reasons for belief. In paradigmatic cases of vi-
sual perceptual knowledge, these reasons are constituted by the fact
that S sees that p, and this is what makes his view a version of epis-
temological disjunctivism. Subjects in epistemically good cases have
access to factive reasons that are not available to subjects in epis-
temically bad cases, even though the cases might be introspectively
indistinguishable.
Millar even goes further than Pritchard in explaining how subjects
in good cases can access factive reasons. Subjects are able to know
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that they see that p by exercising a higher-order recognitional ability
[Millar 2010: 181-2]. These higher-order recognitional abilities differ
from perceptual-recognitional abilities in that they do not latch on
to the appearances of objects. After all, no object has a look that is
distinctive for being seen by me. In this case it rather is my having a
certain experience that is distinctive of an object’s being seen by me
[Millar 2011: 339-40]. But in other respects higher-order recognitional
abilities perfectly parallel first-order recognitional abilities.
3.3 Solving the problems of JTBED
Millar’s KFED has some clear advantages over Pritchard’s JTBED.
First of all, KFED does not face the problem of hyper-intellectualiza-
tion with regard to perceptual knowledge. Animals and small chil-
dren can also exercise perceptual-recognitional abilities in part be-
cause this does not involve basing on beliefs on reflective accessible
reasons. This means that it is possible for cognitively unsophisti-
cated believers to see that, and thereby know that, such-and-such is
the case.
Second, KFED provides a clear account of access that is not avail-
able to JTBED. According to KFED, access to factive reasons is pro-
vided by higher-order recognitional abilities: one (usually) knows that
one sees that p because one recognises that one sees that p. Access-
ing a factive reason thus comes down to knowing that the reason
obtains in a way that parallels the way in which we are able to have
perceptual knowledge.
4 Problems for KFED
Despite the good result with regard to JTBED’s problems, KFED
has problems of its own. More specifically, Millar’s account has
the bizarre consequence that justified belief turns out to be logically
stronger than knowledge, while intuitively it is logically weaker. That
is to say, on Millar’s account, knowledge does not entail justified be-
lief, while justified belief does entail knowledge, while intuitively it is
the other way around: knowledge entails justified belief but justified
belief does not entail knowledge. In what follows, we will argue for
both parts of this untoward consequence of Millar’s account.
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4.1 Knowledge does not entail justified belief
To see why, according to Millar, knowledge does not entail justified
belief, just consider cognitively unsophisticated believers again. Al-
though KFED can accommodate the possibility of animal knowledge,
it cannot accommodate what one might call ‘animal justification’ for
visual perceptual beliefs. Such justification requires that a subject
be able to access the fact that he sees that p, which requires a higher-
order recognitional ability. Now, even though unsophisticated believ-
ers might have perceptual-recognitional abilities, it’s implausible that
they also have higher-order recognitional abilities. This means that
KFED does succumb to the hyper-intellectualization objection with
regard to the justification of unsophisticated believers. Unsophisti-
cated believers are never justified in their beliefs that p, even if they
do know that p.
A similar scenario of knowledge without justification should also
be possible for adult human subjects. Given that there are two dis-
tinct recognitional abilities at play in providing respectively knowl-
edge and justification, it should be possible that the lower-order per-
ceptual-recognitional ability is successfully exercised while the high-
er-order recognitional ability is not. The chicken-sexer case might
be used as an instance of this possibility. Although the chicken-
sexer knows, e.g., that the chick is female because of his perceptual-
recognitional ability, he is not in a position to access the relevant
factive reason for his belief, thanks to his false beliefs about how he
knows. KFED would have the consequence that the chicken-sexer in
this scenario knows that the chick is female even though he does not
justifiably believe that the chick is female. And this certainly appears
to be an odd result.
4.2 Justified belief entails knowledge
Let’s turn to the second untoward consequence of Millar’s account,
viz. that justified belief entails knowledge. The reason Millar is com-
mitted to this is that, according to him, possession of the kinds of
factive reasons required for justified perceptual belief is sufficient for
knowing. For instance, in the case of the visual perceptual belief that
p, justification requires that one see that p. At the same time, seeing
that p is said to be a way of knowing that p. In consequence, one will
satisfy Millar’s conditions for justified belief that p here only if one
knows that p. Justified perceptual beliefs that fall short of knowledge
turn out to be impossible.
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To see why this is implausible, consider the case of Barney one
more time. Recall that Barney is looking at one of the few real barns
in fake barn county and acquires a true visual perceptual belief that
he is looking at a barn. Intuitively, it is highly plausible that Barney’s
belief, whilst falling short of knowledge, is both justified and true. As
we have already seen, Millar has no problems with accounting for the
intuition that Barney doesn’t know that the structure he is looking at
is a barn. If Barney doesn’t know that he is facing a barn, however,
then, according to Millar, he also does not see that he is facing a
barn. But if he doesn’t see that he is facing a barn he does not have
the kind of factive reason that is required for his corresponding visual
perceptual belief to be justified.7
It will not come as a surprise that Millar is well aware of this
problem. He ventures to address it in the following passage:
[T]he notion of justified belief that figures in traditional
analysis and in descriptions of Gettier cases is [ . . . ] very
weak. It has everything to do with a kind of reasonable-
ness that renders one blameless in thinking that some-
thing is so, but little to do with the kind of well-grounded-
ness that settles that something is so and on that account
entitles one to take it to be so.
[Millar 2010: 102]
Millar’s idea is to distinguish between two varieties of justified be-
lief, a strong and a weak one. The strong variety is captured by his
account of justification. In contrast, the weak variety is unpacked
in terms of blamelessness. For a belief to possess justification of the
weak sort is for it to enjoy “a kind of reasonableness that renders one
blameless in thinking that something is so” (ibid.). Crucially, Millar
acknowledges that agents in Gettier cases do not possess the strong
variety of justification. In order to address the intuition that the be-
liefs of agents in Gettier cases are justified Millar goes on to claim
that their beliefs are justified in the weak sense: they are reasonable
7 Note that this problem can in principle be avoided by rejecting that seeing
that p is a way of knowing that p. At the same time, it is hard to deny that seeing
that p is at least factive. In consequence, even if one rejects that seeing is a way
of knowing, it still follows from Millar’s account that justified perceptual belief is
factive, which is almost equally bad and leaves Millar open to the new evil demon
problem [Lehrer 1983, Cohen 1984] and counterexamples involving the unlucky
counterparts of gettiered agents (who end up with intuitively justified but false
beliefs).
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in a way that renders the agents blameless.8
Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that Millar’s explanation
is ultimately unsatisfactory. To bring this out consider the case of
Ben who belongs to an isolated and benighted community the mem-
bers of which share a common belief that thunderstorms indicate
that their twenty-eared deity is about to scratch its largest left ear.
Just now Ben is witnessing a thunderstorm and comes to believe that
the deity is about to scratch an ear. Given the common belief of
Ben’s community concerning the link between thunderstorms and
ear-scratchings, the belief Ben acquires in this case is reasonable in a
way that renders him blameless in believing as he does. As a result,
Ben’s belief does enjoy the weak variety of justification that Millar
countenances and uses to explain the intuition of justification in the
above cases. To see the problem for Millar, notice that there is an
epistemically important difference between Ben on the one hand and
Barney on the other. Where Ben’s belief does not have any connection
to truth whatsoever, Barney acquires his beliefs in a way that usually
leads to true beliefs. To make the point less externalist, although Ben
may have done nothing epistemically wrong in coming to believe as
he does, Barney appears to have done something epistemically right
in coming to believe as he did. By explaining the intuitions of justifi-
cation in the problem cases in terms of blamelessness, KFED is bound
to collapse an epistemically important distinction between Ben on the
one hand and Barney on the other.9
5 Discursive Justification
We have argued that both versions of epistemological disjunctivism
are ultimately unsuccessful. JTBED encounters the problem of ani-
mal knowledge and the problem of providing a satisfactory account
of reflective accessibility. On the other hand, KFED has the untoward
8 Notice also that the same line will serve to account for the intuition in cases of
justified false beliefs.
9 See [Gettier 1963, Shope 1983, Lycan 2006] for more on Gettier cases. The
case of Ben is a variation of a case by Goldman [1988]. See [Kelp 2011a] and [Bird
2007] for similar arguments that blamelessness and justification come apart. It is
worth noting that, while Pritchard does not explicitly address the question whether
agents like Barney can have justified beliefs, his treatment of the new evil demon
problem suggests that he would favour an account of the intuition of justification in
terms of blamelessness as well [Pritchard 2012a: 42-4]. If so, Pritchard is of course
bound to run into exactly the same problem as Millar does.
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consequence that justified belief is logically stronger (rather than log-
ically weaker) than knowledge.
But perhaps we haven’t been as charitable in our treatment of
epistemological disjunctivism as we could have been. Recall that part
of the motivation for disjunctivism was that it is common practice to
justify beliefs by appealing to factive reasons. Relatedly, at some
point Millar notes that “justified belief involves being in a position to
justify one’s belief” [2010: 113, n.15]. It is not hard to see that some of
the arguments in the previous sections can be taken to put pressure
on this claim as well. For instance, if we want to allow that cogni-
tively unsophisticated agents can have perceptually justified beliefs,
then Millar’s claim is bound to turn out false as well. After all, such
agents will not be in a position to justify their beliefs.
Crucially, however, instead of taking this point to further con-
firm the case against epistemological disjunctivism, we might also
take it as an indication that its champions have been after a differ-
ent kind of justification. More specifically, let’s distinguish between
epistemic (or e-) justification and discursive (or d-) justification, where
e-justification is the kind necessary for knowledge and d-justification
the kind required to be in a position to properly justify one’s belief.
What we have argued thus far is that disjunctivism does not work
as an account of e-justification. However, perhaps a more charitable
way of reading disjunctivism is as an account of d-justification.
Let’s briefly recapitulate what epistemological disjunctivism, in-
terpreted now as an account of d-justification, would look like. We
will here focus on Millar’s version. Suppose I see that p and con-
sequently perceptually know that p. In order to have d-justification
for p, I must be in a position to justify my belief that p and that,
in turn, requires me to possess and be able to access a reason for p.
The reason is of course the factive reason of seeing that p and ac-
cess is analysed in terms of the exercise of an ability to know. More
specifically, when called upon to justify my perceptual belief that p, I
exercise my higher-order recognitional ability and thus access a rea-
son for believing that p, to wit, that I see that p. I am then free to
justify my belief that p by appealing to my reason for p, viz. that I
see that p.
We agree with Millar that this works perfectly fine for the good
case, i.e. the case in which my perceptual belief that p qualifies as
knowledge. Unfortunately, there are once again problems on the
horizon. To see this, notice that it is highly plausible that it is pos-
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sible to have d-justification in Gettier cases involving perceptual be-
liefs. For instance, Barney very plausibly not only has e-justification,
but also d-justification. However, if d-justification is analysed along
the lines suggested on behalf of Millar, we will be hard pressed to
accommodate this datum. Here is why. To begin with, (i) seeing is
a way of knowing and so one sees that p only if one knows that p.
Moreover, (ii) access to reasons is unpacked in terms of recognitional
abilities, that is, in terms of abilities to know. Finally, (iii) exercise of
ability is taken to be a success notion: one cannot exercise an ability
to φ unless one φs. From (ii) and (iii) it follows that if one does access
the proposition that one sees that p, then one knows that one sees
that p. Given the factivity of knowledge and (i), it follows that one
accesses the proposition that one sees that p only if one knows that p.
On Millar’s account, then, one can have d-justification for the belief
that p only if one knows that p.
The question we’d like to address is whether Millar’s account can
be tweaked in order to accommodate d-justification in the cases of
belief that falls short of knowledge. We think the answer is ‘yes’. Of
course, in order to achieve this, we need to reject at least one out of
(i), (ii) and (iii). In this paper, we’d like to explore the prospects for
an account of d-justification that rejects (iii).10
One immediate difficulty for this approach is that we are now
in need of an alternative account of the notion of exercise of ability.
Moreover, given that the output of an exercise of ability is not, or at
least not always, knowledge, we are facing another difficulty. After
all, if I know for instance, that I see that p, it seems that I can indeed
properly justify p by appealing to my seeing that p. If the output is
not knowledge this is no longer clear. Suppose I have come to believe
10 There is some reason to think that this option is the only adequate one. To
see this, notice first that it is very plausibly possible to have d-justification for
false beliefs. Even if we rejected (i), it remains very plausible that seeing that p is
factive. Given that we hold on to (ii) and (iii), it still follows that one can access
the proposition that one sees that p, only if p is true. We would still be unable
to accommodate the possibility of d-justified but false beliefs. Moreover, notice
that the standard way of analysing the notion of a recognitional ability, if not as
an ability to know, is as an ability to form true beliefs [e.g. Greco 2010, Sosa 2007].
Thus, even if, in addition, we abandon (ii) and unpack the notion of a recognitional
ability as an ability to form true beliefs, so long as we hold on to (iii), one exercises
the higher-order recognitional ability only if one truly believes that one sees that p.
Given the factivity of seeing, again one accesses the proposition that one sees that
p only if p. In that case, again, it turns out to be impossible to have d-justification
for a false belief.
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that I see that p based on a toin-coss. In that case, even though I
might go on to appeal to my seeing that p in order to justify my
belief that p, it now seems that my doing so will not allow me to
mount a proper justification of p. So, we need to specify what the
output of an unsuccessful exercise of a recognitional ability is and
we need to show that, whatever it turns out to be, it can provide an
adequate basis for a proper justification of the target proposition.
Fortunately, all of these difficulties can be overcome. In fact, one
of us has elsewhere [Kelp 2015a,b] defended a view called “knowl-
edge first virtue epistemology” (KFVE) that will give us exactly what
we need here. In what follows we provide a brief sketch of the rele-
vant aspects11 of this view.12
KFVE combines a knowledge first with a virtue theoretic approach
to epistemology. In order to get a clearer view of what this account
amounts to, we’d first like to say a few more things about virtue
epistemology. Virtue epistemology ventures to analyse knowledge
and justified belief in terms of abilities. Roughly, abilities are con-
strued as dispositions to perform well, i.e. to produce successful per-
formances. For instance, to have the ability to hit the target in target
archery is to have a disposition to produce shots that hit the target.
The rough account of abilities needs to be finessed. To see this,
let’s return to the archery example. Notice that an agent may have
the ability to hit the target of target archery even though he is not
disposed to produce shots that hit the target whilst asleep, drunk,
distracted, etc. or when shooting in strong winds, at sabotaged tar-
gets, etc. This motivates a relativisation of abilities to conditions con-
cerning the shape of the agent (SH) and situational conditions (SI).
In case of archery ability, the ability to hit the target is relative to the
agent’s being awake, sober, sufficiently concentrated, etc. (= SH) and
to there being normal winds, no sabotaged targets, etc. (= SI).
11 Note that our presentation of KFVE leaves out some details of the view. For a
full development of KFVE see [Kelp 2015a].
12 It is not hard to see that our account of d-justification is also available to pro-
cess reliabilists [e.g Goldman 1979, Lyons 2009] and traditional virtue epistemol-
ogists [e.g. Sosa 2007, Greco 2010] (at least given the account of abilities sketched
below). In fact, one of us briefly outlines the contours of a process reliabilist ac-
count higher-order beliefs briefly in [Ghijsen 2014]. The main reason we are opting
for a KFVE implementation of the account here is that it allows us to stay as close
as possible to Millar’s own account, which also falls within the knowledge first
paradigm. For arguments that virtue epistemology is preferable to process reliabil-
ism see [e.g. Greco 2000, 2010]. See [Kelp 2015a] for reasons to favour KFVE over
traditional virtue epistemology.
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Notice, furthermore, that an agent may have more than one way of
producing performances. For instance, an archer may have more than
one way of producing shots. To keep things simple, let’s suppose he
has two ways: he can shoot with his right hand or with his left.
Suppose he is disposed to perform well when producing shots in
one way (with his right, say) but not the other (with his left, say).
Suppose, finally, that our archer is disposed to produce shots with
his left hand. His dominant way of shooting is with his left. In
that case, there is a clear sense in which our archer is not disposed
to hit the target. Even so, our archer possesses an ability to hit the
target, viz. when shooting with his right. It’s just that he is disposed
not to exercise this ability. These considerations suggest that abilities
are relative not only to SH and SI, but also to ways of producing
performances. Abilities are dispositions to perform well in suitable
SH and SI via certain ways of performance production.
This account of abilities is combined with the following account
of the exercise of ability: to exercise a certain ability is to produce a
performance via the way of performance production underlying it.
For instance, for our archer to exercise his ability to hit the target is
for him to produce a shot via the way of shot production underlying
his ability. Crucially, the idea here is that unsuitable SH prevent the
agent from using his way of performance production and hence from
exercising his ability. For instance, when our archer is asleep, drunk,
distracted, etc., he is not in a position to use the way of shooting that
underlies his ability to hit the target in more favourable SH. As a
result, in those SH he is not in a position to exercise this ability. In
contrast, unsuitable SI do not prevent the agent from exercising his
ability. This happens when our agent takes a shot that would have hit
the target had it not been blown off its trajectory by a gust of wind or
had the target not been protected by a forcefield. In these cases our
agent produces his shot in the same way that constitutes an ability
to hit the target in more favourable SI. So, here he does exercise his
ability.
It is now easy to see that the present account differs from Millar’s
in that the notion of exercise of ability is not a success notion. That is
to say, it is possible to exercise an ability and produce an unsuccessful
performance. In fact, this is exactly what happens in the above cases
in which our archer’s shot is blown off target or the target he shoots
at is protected by a forcefield.
Virtue epistemology uses an account of abilities and their exer-
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cise, like the one just sketched, to offer accounts of knowledge and
e-justified belief. Standard virtue epistemology identifies a (perhaps
the) fundamental kind of epistemic success with true belief. Accord-
ingly, one important class of epistemic abilities are abilities to form
true beliefs. E-justified belief is then identified with belief that is
produced by the exercise of such an epistemic ability. Knowledge is
belief that is successful because of the exercise of such an epistemic
ability.13
In contrast, KFVE countenances knowledge as a (perhaps the) fun-
damental kind of epistemic success. Accordingly, one important class
of epistemic abilities are abilities to know. While it is not hard to see
that KFVE cannot hope to offer a reductive analysis of knowledge
in terms of such epistemic abilities, [Kelp 2015a] argues that the fol-
lowing ability condition knowledge holds (and does so non-trivially):
one knows that p only if one believes p via the exercise of an ability to
know in favourable SI. Most importantly for present purposes, how-
ever, the following reductive analysis of e-justified belief is proposed:
one e-justifiably believes that p if and only if one believes that p via
the exercise of an ability to know. In other words, the idea is that
knowledge requires belief from ability to know in favourable situa-
tional conditions and e-justified belief is belief from ability to know,
no matter whether situational conditions are favourable or not.
It may be worth noting that KFVE avoids the problems outlined
for Pritchard and Millar in §2 and §4 above, where these are under-
stood as accounts of e-justification.
First, it is easy to see that KFVE allows for perceptual knowledge
(and e-justified belief) in unsophisticated agents. After all, what mat-
ters to perceptual knowledge and e-justified belief is acquiring beliefs
via the right kinds of ability rather than accessible reasons. Since it
is uncontroversial that animals and small children have these abili-
ties and frequently acquire beliefs via their exercise, they can have
perceptual knowledge and e-justified belief.
Second, on the present accounts of knowledge and e-justified be-
lief, knowledge entails e-justified belief. After all, by the condition
on knowledge, knowledge requires belief produced via an exercise
of ability to know in suitable SI, which in turns requires belief pro-
duced via an ability to know. By the account of e-justified belief, this
13 For more on standard virtue epistemology see e.g. [Greco 2010, 2012, Sosa
2007, 2011, Pritchard 2010, 2012b]. One of us has also explored the prospects of
versions of this view in [Kelp 2011b, 2013, 2014a,b].
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is sufficient for e-justified belief.
Third, e-justified belief does not entail knowledge. To see this,
notice that agents in Gettier cases such as Barney turn out to have
e-justified beliefs. Barney acquires his beliefs that he is facing a barn
in a way that constitutes an ability to know in more favourable SI. On
the above account of the exercise of ability, he acquires his beliefs via
an ability to know (albeit in unsuitable SI). Given KFVE’s account of
e-justified belief, this means that his belief is e-justified.14
With KFVE in play, we can now see how we can make sense of d-
justification of perceptual belief via factive reasons in the problematic
bad cases.
In essence, the story parallels Millar’s fairly closely. Suppose I
have an e-justified perceptual belief that p. To move straight to the
problem cases, suppose my belief falls short of knowledge that p
(because I am gettiered or else my belief is false). Suppose I am
called upon to justify my belief. Just as in the good case, I exercise
a higher-order recognitional ability, which outputs a belief that I see
that p. Of course, since I do not know that p, my belief that I see that
p is false and hence does not qualify as knowledge. Even so, I acquire
it in exactly the same way in which, in more favourable SI, I come to
know that I see that p. By the above account of exercises of abilities,
I acquire my belief via the exercise of an ability to know. Moreover,
since my belief that I see that p is produced via the exercise of an
ability to know, by the above account of e-justified belief, my belief
that I see that p is e-justified. Again, I am free to justify my belief
that p by appealing to my reason for p, viz. that I see that p.
It is easy to see how the account addresses the difficulties that
arose by allowing for unsuccessful exercises of abilities mentioned
above. First, we have offered an alternative account of exercises of
abilities in terms of uses of ways of performing on which unsuccess-
ful exercises of abilities are possible. Second, given KFVE, in case
of abilities to know, the outputs of exercises of these abilities are e-
justified beliefs. While a completely unjustified belief that I see that p
(e.g. one that is based on a coin-toss) does not serve to provide an ad-
equate basis for a proper justification of p, an e-justified belief that I
14 Note also that KFVE can avoid the new evil demon problem [Kelp 2015b].
Agents in radical sceptical scenarios also form their perceptual beliefs in the same
ways as they would have had they not been in a sceptical scenario, i.e. via exercise
of abilities to know. Moreover, the same goes for unlucky counterparts of agents in
Gettier cases. In consequence, in both types of case KFVE predicts that the agents’
beliefs are e-justified.
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see that p very plausibly does. In this way, we now have an account of
d-justification for perceptual belief in which factive reasons—notably
seeing that p—play a central part and which allows for d-justification
even in cases of belief that falls short of knowledge.
Conclusion
It comes to light that epistemological disjunctivism remains unsatis-
factory both in its traditional (JTB) and its knowledge first incarna-
tion. More specifically, epistemological disjunctivism fails not only as
an account of e-justification but also if it is interpreted, perhaps more
charitably, as an account of d-justification. That said, we believe that
disjunctivists were right on at least a couple of points: we standardly
justify our perceptual beliefs by appealing to factive reasons such as
seeing that p and so factive reasons ought to play some role in our
theory of justification. In addition, we think Millar’s claim that access
of factive reasons proceeds via the exercise of higher-order recogni-
tional abilities is spot on. We have argued that in conjunction with
KFVE, these insights can be used to offer an account of d-justification
of perceptual beliefs in which perceptual beliefs are d-justified by
factive reasons of the form I see that p.
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